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The author describes the theory of an emerging interdisciplinary field called 'ecological
science, ' the study of which leads to innovative ideas about the nature of God.
Science and theology have long been
blood-brothers, and they have feuded as
only close relatives can. While each has
longed to claim a primacy of vision and
truth for itself alone, theology based upon
sacred texts and revealed truth, and science
upon doubt, procedure, and discovery, they
have always shared a fundamental belief
about the nature of reality—a belief in the
ancient Greek philosophical notions of
perfection. They have shared a search for
the immutable, the unchanging, the first
cause, the unmoved mover, the Theory of
Everything, the Mind of God. The first
scientists were frank about their search for
God in the laws of the universe; somewhere
there were regularities to be discovered,
rules that God had put in place when
creating the universe, rules that still
governed. Knowing these laws would
provide the solid basis for a moral human
life. God as the Good, the first cause, the
unmoved mover is familiar in theology, and
much thought has been devoted to ferreting
out this God through the judicious use of
logic and elimination—God must do good
and not evil, for instance.
However, recent changes in science
question the very existence of perfect,
unchanging essence. Critiques of the
traditional scientific quest for essential
truths propose a very different metaphysical
vision, one based upon process and relation
as formative and fundamental. This
"ecological" science prompts us to reread
the scriptures with different assumptions in
mind, and to notice that Jesus said, "The
kingdom of God is among you." 1
Theology has sought to define how God
must be, while science has sought God in
the natural world, basing the search upon
theological ideas of God. Many of the
defining characteristics of God have been
rooted in ancient Greek philosophy. .The
goal of the early Greek philosophers was to
"account for all natural phenomena in terms
of a few simple substances or principles." 2
These substances or principles had to adhere
to the Greek notions of perfection; they had
to be unchanging, transcendent, and immu-
table. Plato developed a notion of Forms,
which sees the material world as a shadowy
and imperfect realization of a spiritual ideal.
This spiritual ideal must represent the
perfect essence of its material realization,
thus it must be unchanging, immutable,
timeless. This philosophical frame of
reference was picked up by early Jewish and
Christian theologians such as Philo of
Alexandria and Augustine, and so on into
modern theology and modern science.
The Jewish theologian Philo (d. c. 50
C.E.) wedded Greek philosophy and Hebrew
religion to'develop a doctrine of God as pure
being, as the First Principle. 3 Augustine of
Hippo (5th c.) later made similar claims—
that God must be pure being, immutable and
unchanging. 4 David Pailin points out some
of the problems with the logical progression
of these ideas about God in theology.
According to Pailin, both Anselm (1 l-12th
c) and Aquinas (13th c) conceived a God
that cannot relate to or be affected by
creatures, for to do so would be to compro-
mise the divine perfection and immutability."
This quest for the essence, or essential
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definition, of God continues to the present had combined objects in the natural world
day. The problem with this endeavor is that into stable and predictable systems. 8 This
in the search for God's essence, God must model sees a world that functions as a
immediately be made finite and bounded by machine, and that can be understood as
human rationality. God must be good and such. It assumes that the existence of
not evil, unmoved but capable of setting in discrete entities that interact in a linear
motion. Paul Tillich, for example, attempts fashion, and that by discovering these
to unbind God by defining Deity as both entities and their interactions, one can
being and non-being; and yet he still successfully predict and thus control the
weights being, equating it with goodness. 6 future.
Science, in seeking the mind of God in the Two centuries after Descartes set forth
natural world, has been plagued with these the basic principles of science, Thomas
same assumptions about God. Huxley, natural scientist and friend to
Early science sought to discover the Charles Darwin, struggled to realize a
laws and universal principles that God put - comprehensive scientific model of knowl-
into place when creating the universe. As edge based on the world-as-machine model,
such, the laws and universal principles that Huxley, in his Essays, felt that the paradigm
science would uncover must necessarily of the machine could be applied to all areas
reflect the same paradigm as God's own of study in the natural sciences. Once one
self; they must be unchanging, universal, had determined the laws and principles that
perfect, and true. Rene Descartes laid down moved the machine, one would have
a paradigm of proper knowledge in his discovered the mind of God and would have
Discourse on Method and Meditations on a basis for moral action, for nature "is
First Philosophy, unconsciously using these ' creating a firm and living faith in the
same categories. Descartes hoped that by existence of immutable moral and physical
using a system of radical doubt and skepti- laws, perfect obedience to which is the
cism, and by applying all "ideas"7 to that highest possible aim of an intelligent
doubt, one could discover things that one being."9
could not doubt, and these ideas could then Worldviews are subject to change,
be considered to be
true. His methodoi What I will call ecological science encompasses
ogy consisted of many theories, such as chaos, bifurcation,
breaking down ideas
into their component f catastrophe, complexity and hierarchy, as well
parts, testing the asfeminist post-modern critiques of traditional
parts for truth, and
then rebuilding the I
science -
idea. An idea with
true parts must as a whole be true-much however. Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of
like a machine, whose component parts must Scientific Revolutions, claims that when
have integrity for it to function. current theories and models are found to be
Even though he had developed a inadequate and are subject to repeated and
concept and methodology of radical doubt, systemic theory failure, a revolution in
there were many fundamental assumptions scientific thought occurs. 10 The Cartesian
about the nature of the world that Descartes world-as-machine model has come to be
did not question. Descartes assumed that seen as inadequate to describe the world,
there were indeed fixed laws, put in place by This revolution began first, perhaps, with
God at creation: that matter is inert and physics and Heisenberg's Uncertainty
dead, quickened only in human beings by Principle, which states that the more
the God-given rational soul, and that God accurately one measures a particle's mass,
the less accurately one can measure its
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speed." This principle states that perfect
knowledge in one area precludes it in
another, and thus overturned the possibility
of determinism and certainty at the smallest
level, bringing the Cartesian worldview into
doubt. Ecology, as a science based upon
systems rather than discrete entities, is a
more recent challenge to the traditional
scientific model, questioning the basis for
reductionism, linearity, and cause-and-effect
models.
Recent critiques of traditional science
range across a spectrum of the degree to
which they disagree with Cartesian defini-
tions of reality. What I will call ecological
science encompasses many theories, such as
chaos, bifurcation, catastrophe, complexity
and hierarchy, as well as feminist post-
modern critiques of traditional science.
These theories, or sciences, are ecological in
that they seek to understand systems of
relation and process, rather than discrete
entities or universal principles. Upholders
of theories such as chaos, complexity and
hierarchy, however, seem more inclined to
accept the existence of an external reality,
while feminist, post-modern critiques
maintain that we create the reality that we
seek to explain. They diverge in that
sciences of complexity focus on new ways
of doing science, and post-modern critiques
focus on new ways of doing science. Both,
however, see relation and process as
fundamental realities, and it is that realiza-
tion that differentiates them from traditional
science.
Chaos, complexity, and hierarchy are
interrelated theories that state that the world
is made up of systems that are inherently
unpredictable (chaos), irreducible and
nonlinear (complexity), and which, there-
fore, must be explained with limited and
contingent theories that are relevant only for
a particular scale or situation (hierarchy).
There are several techniques or theories that
deal with unpredictability—bifurcation,
mathematical chaos, and catastrophe. They
all deal with phenomena of change, and with
the inherent indeterminacy of system '
function. 12 These theories maintain that
systems are naturally chaotic and unpredict-
able, rather than being stable, as a Cartesian
framework assumes. For that reason, they
.
are interested in process and the evolution of
systems, seeing change as a fundamental
reality. Thus, an essential aspect of chaos
theory is that the complex interactions that
arise in systems cannot be extrapolated back
in time, or back to a first cause; predictable
linearity does not hold.
Complexity states that a fundamental
reality of systems is that they are complex,
i.e., nonlinear and irreducible. Non-linearity
has to do with unpredictability and organic
process. Systems or entities do not march
forward in a simple, cause-and-effect
pattern; there is no determined or inevitable
end to any set of interactions. Instead, there
are feedback loops, self-regulatory mecha-
nisms, unknown and indeterminate interac-
tions, phase shifts to new levels of stability.
1 + 1 + 1 may equal 1, or it may equal 57, or
the whole system may shift and negate the
frame of reference that defined the 1. For
example, if one looks at climate change as a
simple, linear system, the temperature of
Earth should increase incrementally as the
level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
increases (if the greenhouse theory is
correct). Recent findings indicate, however,
that marine algal blooms, caused by nutri-
ent-loading from sewage and agricultural
runoff, as well as warming ocean waters,
make a waste product, dimethyl sulfide,
which may seed cloud formation, increase
the albedo effect, and decrease Earth's
temperature. Such feedback loops are an
intrinsic part of self-regulating organic
systems, and they render linear frameworks
useless for understanding, much less for
prediction.
Irreducibility is another facet of
complexity and non-linearity. Irreducibility
holds that the sum is greater that the parts.
Thus, a system cannot be broken into its
individual parts and put back together
through linear logic, as Descartes assumed
was possible; nor can individual organisms
be abstracted from their communities and
contexts as representative of the whole
system. For instance, Stephen Jay Gould
maintains that variation in populations and
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change over time are the reality; one cannot
reduce "horses" to "horse," for example, and
have an understanding for the present, past
or future. The range and variety of horses
within their environments has scientific
meaning and validity, not the concept of the
essential horse, abstracted from relation to
environment and dynamic change. 14 Theo-
ries, as well, cannot be reduced to one
theory that can explain everything. Stewart
and Cohen show that even with a Theory of
Everything (TOE) established within a very
simple, rule-based logical universe—
a
computer program, for instance—chaotic
circumstances arise which the TOE cannot
explain or predict. 15
Hierarchy serves as a theoretical
justification for the patchwork of theories
and explanations that arise out of complexity
and chaos. Hierarchy theory maintains that
reality is made up of interconnected levels
that cannot be reduced to, and understood at,
a more basic level. One cannot abstract a
single individual and hope to explain a
community or society from that person, nor
can one theoretically explain the biological
progression from a single cell to an indi-
vidual human being. Theories must be
located within a particular hierarchical level,
and the findings will be relevant for that
level only. Two different hierarchical levels
probably cannot be described or explained
by the same theory, and no universal theory
can exist to make sense of phenomena.
The fundamental assertion within this
systems mode of thought is that, unlike
Newton's interacting bodies that remain
unchanged by the interaction, individuals do
not exist as discrete entities. Instead, in an
ecological science, entities are seen to be
formed by their relations—to their environ-
ments, to other entities, to their pasts. As
O'Connor points out:
In the view of complexity, the properties that
an element displays are not deemed intrinsic
and immutable to the observed 'object' itself.
Rather, the discernible components together
with their properties 'emerge' and are manifest
within a collective regime of activity. Objects
and properties are the co-effects of the totality
of their interactions. A given element can only
be understood in terms of its inter-being with
the rest of what is (which is, in the first
approximation, the object's environment)."1
This kind of understanding changes the
nature of science itself. The traditional goal
of prediction and control must give way to
respect for the integrity of systems, for
variation, and for diversity. The inherent
unpredictability of reality, rather than being
a stumbling block, can be seen as the vital
signs of a living system. As O'Connor says,
indeterminacy points us toward better
theories and questions about the world. 17
The prediction and manipulation desired by
traditional science is a dead system of
control, not a living conversation with
dynamic phenomena. 18
These criticisms are carried a step
farther by feminist thinkers who use post-
modern concerns about the nature of
objectivity to question the execution of
science, as well as the responsibilities of
scientists themselves. Ina Wagner and
Elisabetta Donini both call for a
contextualization of science and scientists,
and an integration of science into the
responsibilities of process and relation.
Ina Wagner is concerned about the
performance of science by its practitioners.
She sees the need for scientists to work in
context and in responsible relation to the
world. From this perspective, she criticizes
the concept of objectivity, which she claims
allows scientists to evade responsibility for
their work by pretending that the scientific
question and answer were both inevitable,
existing independently of the scientist. 19
The tendency to abstract, and to work in
simulations of reality, encourages the
attitude that science is a game, that all is
permitted, and that social norms, therefore,
are suspended. Scientific inquiry does not
encourage its practitioners to seek out the
difference between model and reality; effort
is focused oh the medium—the conceptual
tools and methods. The problems of
objectivity and abstraction remove the
scientist and scientific endeavor from a
sense of responsibility, accountability, and
meaningful location within a world of very
real issues and problems. Wagner suggests
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several methods for scientists to
recontextualize themselves and their work,
which involve being aware of the political
and technological implications of one's
work, and of the assumptions and paradigms
under which one works; such awareness can
help with the important task of making one's
work accessible to people outside one's own
field. Wagner's critique is useful in bringing
a sense of responsibility and accountability
into scientific practice.
The tendency to abstract, and to work in
simulations of reality, encourages the
attitude that science is a game, that all is
permitted, and that social norms, therefore,
are suspended.
Elisabetta Donini, however, takes this
critique farther in questioning the very
paradigm of science itself. Donini denies
the existence of objectivity as well, seeing
male subjectivity as "embedded in the very
structure of objectivity ascribed to science"
and, therefore, also.calling into question the
inevitability of scientific values and valua-
tions. 20 For Donini, however, the ability to
question objectivity, and thus the presumed
necessity of doing science in a particular
"objectively correct" way, opens a path for
new ways of thinking about science. Donini
and her colleagues in Italy used the problem
of radioactive fallout from Chernobyl to
propose a new scientific ethic. Instead of
the "male-biased aims of building up more
and more sophisticated technological
systems, in an endless challenge to subju-
gate natural forces," Donini proposes an
"awareness of limits" and a sense of being
within the processes and relationships of the
natural world. This "location internal to
process" changes the focus of science from
the ends to the means. Good process means
good relation and, thus, desirable ends.
These critiques of science offered by
chaos, complexity, hierarchy, and feminist
post-modernism question the ancient Greek
philosophical notions of truth and perfect
knowledge as being immutable, universal,
unchanging, and transcendent. Ecological
science locates truth in process and relation,
rather than in objectively discoverable
principles, or definable entities. The
concept of natural law in science-the desire
to locate God in the workings of the
universe—seems a valid way of understand-
ing ourselves and our relation to the divine,
since we are certainly an important part of
the natural world. However, it is unlikely
| that the God we discover
there will be immutable,
unchanging, or perfect in
any philosophical sense.
Jesus said "The
kingdom of God is among
you." 21 If we can find God
| in the process of relation,
I perhaps we can indeed
I dwell in a kingdom of God.
What ecological science points us toward,
however, is an awareness that this kingdom
is not only peopled by human beings, but
must be made up of the entire natural world.
Complexity theory proposes the emergence
of entities from relations, and so emphasizes
our ability to affect and create our world,
while indeterminacy and chaos underscore
our inability to control it. This realization
makes human beings responsible for right
relation, which is all we can do, for control
is forever out of our reach. Perhaps in
means that are respectful of other creatures
and Earth, the kingdom of God can be
created and the ends will take care of
themselves.
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Thomas and Damasio in Dialogue
William C. Mattison, III
The author looks at the role ofhuman emotions in decision-making. After noting the weak-
ness in the Kantian view ofmorality, he examines Thomas Aquinas 's ideas concerning the place
of the passions in moral agency. Finally turning to Antonio Damasio 's interpretations .of con-
temporary neurological research, he finds support for Thomas and new opportunity for fruitful
dialogue between theology and science.
The relation between reason and the
emotions is not often treated in Christian
moral theology. Because moral theology
has traditionally been concerned with the
assignment of praise or blame for human
actions, the will has been the subject of
closest scrutiny. Surely this discipline may
be expected to continue to focus on the
will; however, underlying such a concen-
tration on the will, often may be found a set
of assumptions regarding reason and
emotion. In the exercise of the will, the
moral agent is encouraged to heed the
guidance of reason, and be wary of the
unpredictable and often adulterating
influence of the emotions. When consider-
ing an ethical decision, one is warned,
"Don't be so emotional! Be reasonable
about this!" Emotions are viewed as
unreliable, untamed impulses that interfere
with the "cool" precision of reason. 1
Reason, on the other hand, is seen as the
impartial judge that enables a moral agent
to weigh alternative choices prudently
before selecting the most morally accept-
able. Consequently, theologians of the past
have been, at best, wary of the role of
emotion in the moral life. The most
notorious example of such a view is that of
Kant, who insisted that any moral action, in
order to be considered such, must be
performed purely out of duty. 2 Any other
motivation rendered that action morally .
meaningless. One imagines the Kantian
ideal moral agent as some sort of automa-
ton, coldly moving through life, making
passionless decisions out of duty.
Surely a better understanding of living a
moral life is needed. Moral theology, or
Christian ethics, considers not the immanent
essence of God, but rather how people in
relation to God can make that relation the
defining element of their life. Such treat-
ment always implicitly reveals something
about God. To understand how human
emotion can be most properly understood as
part of that moral life, theologians would be
best served by knowing how emotions
function in the person from the perspective
of biology, psychiatry, and psychology. The
purpose of this paper is to contribute to that
dialogue between theology and the sciences.
It will focus an the relationship between
reason and the emotions as understood by
Thomas Aquinas and by contemporary
neurologist Antonio Damasio. Two prelimi-
nary topics, however, must be addressed
prior to that discussion. First, a brief
description will be offered of how dialogue
between theology and science has pro-
gressed to the present, having paved the way
for current work. Next, a central theological
issue, the relation between nature and grace,
will be adduced as a cornerstone to this
dialogue.
A comparison of Thomas with a
contemporary neurologist may appear odd.
Yet, perhaps due to his knowledge of
Aristotelian naturalistic philosophy, Tho-
mas's theological system is quite thorough
in its elaboration of human anthropology,
' and it directly addresses this issue of the
relation between reason and the emotions.
While describing "man and his acts" 3 in the
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Secunda pars, Thomas is far more nuanced claims a more comprehensive approach in
as to the role of emotion in the moral life matters of ultimate meaning. Finally, he
than the above caricature of Kant's thought. states that theology often claims a privi-
Damasio's work will be offered as a leged place in such dialogue, because the
correction to, yet far from a dismissal of, most important issues in the sciences are
Thomas's vision. In fact, it will be demon- viewed as primarily theological and, hence,
strated that the majority of Thomas's work best left up to theological interpretations and
on the emotions is
quite compatible Understood in tandem, as partners in dialogue.
with modern , .
scientific research. Damasio and Thomas present a vision ofthe
Understood in ro[e of emotions in the moral life that satisfies
tandem, as partners , /»»„», » » ».
in dialogue, Damasio the concerns ofboth theology and science in
and Thomas present their convergence on the truth.
a vision of the role of i
emotions in the moral life that satisfies the approaches. 6 A fine example of these
concerns of both theology and science in approaches is the realm of bioethics, into
their convergence on the truth. which religious ethicists may tread with
As stated above, this dialogue is already little or no understanding of the medical and
well under way. Earlier in this century, biological reality defining the situation.
Alfred North Whitehead melded his work in Yet Gustafson is dissatisfied with these
mathematics and in philosophy to form a approaches. He prefers an intersection
vision that has engendered the process between theology and the sciences with two-
approach to theology. This work continues way traffic. In this scenario, theology still
today through such authors as John Cobb "has a claim to be heard" 7 as much as other
and David Griffin. In "Philosophy and disciplines. Yet theology and ethics also
Philosophising in Theology," Karl Rahner have a responsibility to be informed by
claims that theology's new partner in contributions from other fields of inquiry in
dialogue in the age of pluralism should be their "descriptions, explanations, and
the sciences, as opposed to philosophy. He interpretations of the human."8 It is this
asserts that theology is concerned with model which is supported and utilized in this
humanity's history and future—not as things, essay. It rests on a foundational theological
but as created by humanity. 4 While philoso- assumption, the subject of the second
phy can consider history and the future only preliminary remark.
in a formal manner, "the sciences represent Science is concerned primarily with the
history and the future."5 Paul Davies is a natural, and it can neglect the divine (and
more recent advocate of that dialogue, has often done so). Theology, on the other
speaking from the side of the sciences. hand, is concerned especially with the
One final example of such dialogue divine, yet cannot neglect some treatment of
offered here is the recent book of James M. nature in that vision. However, understand-
Gustafson entitled Intersections. In it he ings of the natural order can vastly vary,
explicitly treats the dynamics of the dia- Some may view the natural realm as
logue. He claims that "intersections" worthless and decrepit, and focus solely on
between theology and science have thus far . the world to come. Others may see it as
been primarily one-way streets, with divinely created and sanctified, albeit
theology serving as informer of the "Godless incomplete. Those involved in the dialogue
sciences." Gustafson finds three reasons between science and theology tend toward
behind this dynamic. He cites religion's the latter position, and Thomas would be a
common claim to special authority by divine good example. His contention that grace
revelation. He notes that theology often perfects nature is well known. He affirms
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Dionysius when he says, "it belongs to between emotions and reason. Yet it is a
Divine providence, not to destroy but to necessary starting point in elaborating his
preserve the nature of things." 9 His treat- main thesis, the conception of an embodied
ment of the order of love confirms that mind (as opposed to "em-brained" mind),
Thomas views divine agency as operative which will not be discussed here. He
not against, but within and through divinely attempts to demonstrate that reason can
created nature. 10 Such, an understanding of never be "pure," in the sense of "emotion-
the relationship between grace and nature is less." He argues that while an overly
crucial to this inquiry. It is here assumed emotional person may reason poorly, so too
that knowledge of God, or especially will the nonemotional person. This argu-
knowledge of how people in relation to God ment is obviously relevant to any judgment
are defined by that relation, can be gleaned of Kant's understanding of morality,
from analysis of divinely created nature. Damasio's methodology combines
Thomas is surely no "naturalist" in the sense experimentation and theory. He begins by
described by Rahner and Vorgrimler, for he describing several cases, briefly treated here,
does not completely identify the natural with to add clarity to his conclusions. Two
the real." But he may be called a "natural patients, Phineas and Eliot, suffered from
theologian" through his affirmations similar disorders, and their cases will be
concerning the natural world, insofar as it is described simultaneously. Both sustained
God's creature. 12 major damage to portions of the frontal lobe
These two preliminary considerations of the brain. Amazingly, the damage spared
are by no means exhaustive treatments of all cognitive, motor, language, and sensory
what are two challenging and complicated abilities. The victims could speak, move
subjects. The brief discussion of theology normally, and solve problems. 13 However,
they were still
Science is concerned primarily with the natural, irrevocabl y changed
They are described
and it can neglect the divine (and has often as fitru i irreverent,
done so). Theology, on the other hand, is con- impatient with things
j . .. ... .» ». • that conflict with
cerned especially with the divine, yet cannot
t
, > . .r J * J their immediate
neglect some treatment of nature in that vision. desires, capricious,
vacillating, and
and science in dialogue is not meant to be a lacking any effective future planning. They
comprehensive account, nor an appraisal of seemed to show no responsibility for
the validity, of the specific work mentioned. themselves or others. It seemed they had
It is merely an indication that some sort of lost something uniquely human." 14
dialogue is extant, and that the comparison As doctors continued to test for intellec-
below is not as odd as it might initially tual defect, they noticed the patients'
seem. The even shorter discussion of the surprising lack of emotion. Eliot is de-
relation between nature and grace barely scribed as totally neutral about everything,
scratches the surface of that topic. Yet it He could recite the circumstances of his
will hopefully remind the reader of instances illness as a completely disinterested ob-
in the Christian tradition-where knowledge server. Eliot even mentioned at one point
of the divine-human relation is gleaned from that he didn't "feel" things emotionally as he
inquiry into the divinely created natural had before his illness. Damasio elaborates
order. on the brain structures that were damaged,
Damasio offers one such attempt in noting their instrumental role in human
Descartes' Error. His explicit purpose is not emotion. Both astonished and horrified, he
merely the re-articulation of the relation asks his readers to imagine being intellectu-
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ally aware of something, and even cognizant
that it once roused them, yet to feel abso-
lutely nothing regarding it. Such was life
for Phineas and Eliot.
Regarding the implications of these
findings for the moral life, the results of
several batteries of tests showed that Eliot
was indeed aware of ethical guidelines, and
would even choose the "morally right"
solution in the laboratory setting. He could
retain, learn, and apply ethical norms, yet
never in the outside world. Neither patient
was able to hold a job, make simple deci-
sions, or maintain familial and other
interpersonal relations. Apparently "some
part of the value system remains, and can be
utilized in abstract terms, but it is uncon-
nected to real-life situations." 15 Once, upon
finishing a set of such tests, Eliot, com-
pletely devoid of emotion, remarked, "After
all this, I still Won't know what to do." 16 In
this,he was wrong: he knew what to do, yet
could not act on that knowledge.
Damasio concludes that "reduction in
emotion may constitute an equally important
source of irrational behavior" (emphasis in
original). 17 He claims that "pure reason" is
an inadequate view of decision-making.
People simply do not imagine all possibili-
ties, weigh them rationally, and select the
most reasonable option. Besides being
wildly inefficient, such an approach would
fail to "moye" the agent toward appropriate
choices. And so he posits a "somatic marker
hypothesis" to explain how people make
choices. As a person envisions different
scenarios, he or she experiences bodily
("somatic") feelings toward them, which
then "mark" that scenario. The person still
rationally weighs alternatives, yet the
emotions contribute to, and maximize
(rather than replace), the efficient use of
reason. Reason alone cannot cope well with
the complexity and uncertainty of life, and
thus requires special assistance. 1S Emotions
are essential in the assignment of basic
value, and provide that assistance. 19 Para-
phrasing Pascal's famous maxim, Damasio
says, "the organism has some reasons that
reason must utilize" (emphasis in original). 2"
One may begin to wonder what any of
this has to do with Thomas Aquinas or even
with theology. The intent here is not to
confine moral theology to the field of
cognitive psychology. Nor is the richness,
complexity, and challenge of the moral life
to be "explained away" with a biological
account of the interplay between reason and
the emotions. Certainly the moral life is not
to be equated with the ability to hold a job or
to recount an experience emotionally. Moral
theology and neurology ask different
questions, utilize different methodologies,
and arrive at different forms of solutions.
Yet both investigate the human reality, and
surely there are intersections between the
impact of.the emotions on reason and the
attempt to live a moral life. So, while the
moral theologian need not grasp the intrica-
cies (or even rely on the validity) of the
somatic marker hypothesis, that theologian
may allow an abundance of empirical
evidence to impact the understanding of the
role of emotions in the moral life.
With this purpose in mind, a brief
description of Thomas's understanding of
the relation between reason and the passions
is offered to further that dialogue. Thomas
directly inquires as to the goodness or
badness of the passions {i.e., emotions) in I-
II, 24, 3. A thorough analysis of this article,
and those that support its presuppositions,
will reveal Thomas's view on this question.
In article three Thomas claims "man's
good is founded upon reason as its root."
Earlier in the work he has established a
systematic vision of humanity in relation to
God, who is the final end and greatest .
happiness for humanity. Reason is the
faculty that specifies actions that will lead
humanity to this end. 21 While reason is
humanity's greatest (natural) asset on the
path toward God, Thomas immediately
asserts in article three that the human "good
will be all the more perfect, according as it
extends to all things pertaining to man." He
seeks an integration of all that is human,
when describing humanity's greatest good.
AH that is naturally and uniquely "human" is
subject to the command of reason. The next
logical question, then, is whether the
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passions are subject to the command of . or. during that decision can only diminish the
reason. The answer to this question will moral goodness of an act.
reveal both the moral quality of the passions, Though employing quite different
and how (or if) they are related to reason. language and methodology, clearly the
Thomas had already addressed this thought of Damasio enjoys intersections
topic in I-II, 17, 7. In that article Thomas with that of Thomas . First, some similari-
reminds the reader that the passions are part ties. Both thinkers view reason as crucial in
of the sensitive appetite. "Now it must be making moral decisions. For Damasio, it
observed that the
sensitive appetite differs Thomas recognizes the valid role of the
from the intellective paSsions in the moral life. They prompt the
appetite, which is called r
m
the will, in the fact that person toward morally good actions. Yet he
the sensitive appetite is a considers their "input" morally appropriate
o?g
W
an! whereaTt°hTwiii only after reason has "decided" on the right
isnot" For Thomas, the way to act. The impact of emotions before
Pas*ions are firm| y or during that decision can only diminish
embodied. As such, °
they are not wholly the moral goodness ofan act.
subject to the command
of reason," since the "condition or disposi- weighs somatically marked alternatives
tion of the body is not subject to the com- (though to describe its role separates reason
mand of reason." However, to the extent - from emotion too distinctly in the process),
that any act of an appetite follows apprehen- For Thomas, reason is the final human
sion (which is regulated by reason), an "act criterion of goodness. Both also claim that
of the sensitive appetite is subject to the the moral life is inadequate without the
command of reason." involvement of emotions. For Thomas, the
Where does that leave the passions? person who possesses the human virtues
Considered in themselves, there is no moral might be called "passionately reasonable."
good or evil in the passions." Yet if they are Damasio might call such a person an
"subject to the command of reason," there is "emotional reasoner." Both paradigms are
moral good or evil in them. 23 That leaves vastly different from the Kantian model, and
the passions in a "twofold relation to the unfortunately neither accurately describes
judgment of reason."24 Antecedently, the Phineas or Eliot.
passions "obscure the judgment of reason" Yet there are subtle differences between
and, hence, diminish the moral quality of an the two paradigms, as should be apparent
act. Yet consequently, the passions can from the above descriptors. Whereas
cooperate with the judgment of reason and Thomas's paradigm is a reasonable person
help a person work "more promptly" toward with passion, Damasio 's person is emotional
the good. In this sense the passions increase before using reason. In other words, the
the moral quality of an act. For "it belongs passions have only consequent moral value
to the perfection of moral or human good, for Thomas. In fact, antecedently they
that the passions themselves also should be "obscure" reason and "diminish" the moral
controlled by reason."25 Thus Thomas quality of an act.- This is far from the case
recognizes the valid role of the passions in for Damasio. While not wanting to make
the moral life. They prompt the person emotion the sole determiner of ethical
toward morally good actions. Yet he action, he certainly proposes a crucial role
considers their "input" morally appropriate for emotion before the use of reason. In
only after reason has "decided" on the right fact, he claims that reason cannot function in
way to act. The impact of emotions before
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the real world without such emotional
predispositions.
Another point on which they diverge is
the assignment of value to choices. For
Thomas this is solely a matter of reason. Yet
for Damasio, the emotions must also be
involved rn that process. Emotions add a
value to a choice that somehow moves the
agent to act toward that option.. (Recall that
Eliot could never act on his accurate
knowledge of ethical convention.) Thomas
indicates a possible openness to such a role
for the emotions in I-II, 24, 4 ad. 2, when he
mentions certain passions as having material
goodness in themselves. Yet in the end,
emotions for Thomas must remain firmly
subject to the command of reason. He even
claims that one way in which passions arise
.consequently is by an overflow from a
strong will! 26
Thomas offers an account of the
passions that gives them an important role in.
the moral life. Yet his account is inadequate
in its overemphasis on the primacy of reason
during moral decision-making. Were it
adequate alone, Eliot and Phineas would be
able to live moral, albeit passionless, lives.
Yet Damasio's work demonstrates. that
reason alone does not compel one to act
morally.
Contemporary theologians would
benefit from drawing on Thomas's largely
accurate work on the passions, along with
some correction from recent neurobiological
research, in order to construct a vision of the
moral life in which the emotions enjoy their
proper role. This paper is obviously only
the beginning of that task. Several issues
are yet to be addressed. For instance, moral
theologians today tend to elaborate an.
"ethics of being," or even a virtue ethic,
approaches not treated here. It is supposed
that such demonstration of the necessity of
emotion in an act-based ethic would make
that task easier. Perhaps Thomas's moral
virtues would result in passions that could
antecedently contribute to moral decision-
making. There are also issues of religious
and ethical motivation that are only hinted at
here. Finally, an approach has been chosen
here that is more individualistic than would
be preferred either by evolutionary biolo^
gists or by community ethicists. Future
work to broaden the scope of approach
along these lines promises to be fruitful,
owing to the benefits offered by theology
and science in dialogue.
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